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Fighting corruption with cultural dynamics: when legal-origins, religious-
influences and existing corruption-control levels matter
Abstract
Are  there  different  determinants  in  the  fight  against  corruption  across  developing 
countries?  Why  are  some  countries  more  effective  at  battling  corruption  than  others?  To 
investigate these concerns we  examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the 
conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries 
for the period 2002-2010. Our findings  demonstrate that blanket corruption-control policies are 
unlikely to succeed equally across countries with  different legal-traditions, religious-influences 
and  political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should 
be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and tailored differently across the 
best and worst  corruption-fighting countries especially with respect to democracy, population 
growth and economic prosperity.
JEL Classification: C10; H10; K10; O10; O55
Keywords:  Corruption; Democracy; Government quality; Quantile regression; Africa
1. Introduction
Corruption  remains  one  of  the  most  daunting  institutional  challenges  for  majority  of 
African countries.  As supported by several studies and surveys,  it  is a major impediment  to 
economic progress, social  welfare, service delivery and good governance in the continent.  In 
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accordance with  the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa(UNECA,2009, p.1), it is 
estimated that in 2004, the continent lost more than $148 billion to corruption; approximately 
25% of its Gross Domestic Product(GDP). More so, the African Development Bank(ADB,2006, 
p.7)  suggests  that  50% of  tax revenue and $30 billion  in  aid  for  Africa  ends up in  corrupt 
pockets.  In line with the UNECA(2005), corruption ranked as one of the three most  serious 
national   problems  confronting  African  countries,  the  other  two  being  unemployment  and 
poverty. 
Many African  countries  have  enacted  laws,  adopted  policy measures  and established 
institutions in attempts to address the concern. Still corruption continues to be a lingering issue 
in  governance  and  economic  life.  Though  some  consensus  is  gradually  emerging  on  the 
determinants  of  corruption  across  countries,  a  number  of  aspects  remain  unsolved.  Today 
policies in the fight against  the scourge embraced by national  governments and international 
organizations  happen to be similar  across  countries.  Yet the effectiveness  of some of these 
measures remain ambiguous (Billger & Goel, 2009). In the present paper we attempt to explain 
determinants in the fight against corruption. Its contribution to the literature is threefold. (1) By 
focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable, we examine if corrupt and ‘clean’ nations 
respond differently to factors that deter corrupt activity. Contrary to mainstream literature,  we 
are  able  to  provide  an  assessment  of  corruption-control  contingent  on  the  distribution  of 
corruption-control.  (2)  The  use  of  much  recent  data(2002-2010)  based  on  majority(46)  of 
African  countries  provides  findings  with   inclusive  and  updated  policy  implications.  (3) 
Disaggregation of the dataset into four homogenous panels, reflecting legal-origins(Common-
law and Civil-law) and religious-influences(Christianity and Islam) could provide more targeted 
policy  implications.  Though  studies  have  focused  on  legal  and  cultural  determinants  of 
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corruption(La  Porta  et  al.,1999),   to  the   best  of  our  knowledge  this  is  the  first  paper  that 
examines these determinants when existing corruption levels matter.   Thus by examining the 
determinants  of  corruption-control  throughout  the  conditional  distribution  with  particular 
emphasis on the best and worst fighters of corruption, policy measures could focus beyond legal-
origins  and  religious-influences  if  determinants  of  corruption-control  differ  across  the 
conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data
We  assess  a  panel  of  46  countries  with  updated  data(2002-2010)  from  African 
Development Indicators(ADI) of the World Bank(WB). To allow for more options in policy 
implications,  the  dataset  is  disaggregated  into  legal-origins(English  common-law and French 
civil-law)  and  religious-influences(Christianity  and  Islam).  The  endogenous  variable  is  the 
‘control  of  corruption’  indicator;  in  line  with  the  corruption  literature(Billger  &  Goel,2009; 
Okada  & Samreth,2012;  Asongu,2012).  Five  control  variables  are  used:  level  of  economic 
prosperity,  population  growth,  democracy,  regulation  quality  and  government  effectiveness. 
These measures have been used collectively or  separately in a significant bulk of the corruption 
literature(Bardhan,1997; Treisman,2000; Billger & Goel,2009). 
2.2 Methodology 
Borrowing from the  literature  (Billger  &  Goel ,2009),  to  determine  whether  existing 
levels  of  corruption-control  affect  how various  determinants  in  the  battle  against  corruption 
come into play, we use Quantile Regression(QR).  The  θ th quantile estimator of the outcome 
variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem.
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Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) that is founded on minimizing the 
sum of squared residuals, with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is :
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
where unique slope parameters are derived for each  θ th quantile of interest. For the model in 
Eq.(2) the dependent variable iy  is the corruption-control indicator while ix  contains a constant 
parameter,  GDP growth,  population  growth,  democracy,  regulation  quality  and  government 
effectiveness. In comparison to OLS, the QR approach is more robust in the presence of outliers 
when  the  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable  is  a  highly  non-normal  pattern(Okada  & 
Samreth, 2012).  We also report results of Least Absolute Deviations(LAD) which correspond to 
the 0.5th  quantile. 
3. Empirical results
3.1 Legal origins: Common-law and Civil-law countries 
The findings presented in Table 1 entail OLS, LAD and QR estimates. While Panel A 
presents  results  for  English  common-law  countries,  findings  for  their  French  civil-law 
counterparts are captured by Panel B.  OLS estimates provide a baseline of mean effects and we 
compare these to estimates of LAD and separate quantiles in the conditional distributions of the 
outcome variable. 
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Table 1: Legal-origin  determinants of Corruption-Control(CC)
Panel A:  English Common-Law Countries(17)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.029 -0.007 0.069 0.020 -0.007 0.068 0.323**
(0.731) (0.949) (0.540) (0.743) (0.928) (0.615) (0.040)
Economic Prosperity -0.003 -0.004 0.012 0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
(0.607) (0.611) (0.109) (0.231) (0.367) (0.434) (0.605)
Population growth -0.149*** -0.134*** -0.328*** -0.254*** -0.134*** -0.065 -0.050
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.178) (0.364)
Democracy 0.026*** 0.025** 0.005 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.027** 0.035**
(0.002) (0.034) (0.627) (0.002) (0.001) (0.044) (0.025)
Regulation  Quality 0.613*** 0.644*** 0.664*** 0.649*** 0.644*** 0.628*** 0.731***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Specification 2
Constant -0.095 -0.083 -0.332*** -0.325*** -0.083 0.178** 0.321***
(0.157) (0.592) (0.000) (0.000) (0.257) (0.018) (0.006)
Economic Prosperity 0.003 -0.002 0.025*** 0.018*** -0.002 -0.003 0.004
(0.491) (0.822) (0.000) (0.000) (0.623) (0.546) (0.616)
Population growth -0.011 -0.005 -0.094*** -0.063*** -0.005 -0.053* 0.006
(0.680) (0.915) (0.001) (0.000) (0.858) (0.074) (0.887)
Democracy 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.017*** 0.006 0.009 0.004
(0.134) (0.542) (0.337) (0.000) (0.397) (0.260) (0.719)
Government Effectiveness 0.828*** 0.841*** 0.796*** 0.773*** 0.841*** 0.797*** 0.862***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Panel B: French Civil-Law Countries(29)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.295*** -0.061 -0.144* -0.040 -0.061 -0.021 -0.061***
(0.000) (0.376) (0.087) (0.445) (0.431) (0.885) (0.379)
Economic Prosperity -0.013*** -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007* -0.014* -0.028***
(0.002) (0.316) (0.744) (0.169) (0.066) (0.059) (0.000)
Population growth 0.054 -0.034 -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.034 0.026 0.195***
(0.157) (0.380) (0.001) (0.000) (0.311) (0.689) (0.000)
Democracy 0.006 0.004 0.014** 0.016*** 0.004 0.008 -0.024***
(0.334) (0.531) (0.029) (0.000) (0.441) (0.464) (0.000)
Regulation  Quality 0.642*** 0.788*** 0.838*** 0.814*** 0.788*** 0.701*** 0.479***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 261
Specification 2
Constant -0.261*** -0.187* -0.199*** -0.239*** -0.187*** -0.146*** -0.152**
(0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.041)
Economic Prosperity -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.006** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth 0.136*** 0.098 -0.100*** -0.011 0.098*** 0.167*** 0.235***
(0.000) (0.169) (0.000) (0.647) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.006* -0.014**
(0.638) (0.464) (0.502) (0.629) (0.434) (0.083) (0.013)
Government Effectiveness 0.818*** 0.837*** 0.659*** 0.722*** 0.837*** 0.837*** 0.801***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 261
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption  index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. 
The following findings could be established. (1) While economic prosperity increases 
corruption-control(hence  CC)  in  countries  with  English  legal  tradition(with  significance  at 
bottom quantiles), it does the contrary in French civil-law countries(with increasing significance 
across  the  distribution).  (2)  Population  growth  is  a  negative  tool  for  CC  with  decreasing 
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magnitude for English common-law countries. However its corresponding increasing magnitude 
in French civil countries turn to make population a positive tool in CC at top quantiles. (3) While 
democracy  is  a  positive  tool  for  CC  in  English   common-law  countries   with  increasing 
magnitude, French countries experience a negative effect at the top quantiles of their distribution. 
(4) Government effectiveness and regulation quality  increase CC in both legal systems. (5) OLS 
estimates are significantly different from those of QR across the distributions; confirming the 
hypothesis that OLS estimates maybe a misleading policy basis, when countries with the same 
legal  traditions  have different levels  of CC.  (6)The LAD  findings correspond to the 0.50 th 
quantile results across specifications.
3.2  Religious-influences: Christian and Islamic countries 
The  findings  presented  in  Table  2  depict  religious-influences  in  the  fight  against 
corruption.  While  Panel  A presents results  for Christianity dominated countries,  findings for 
their Islam oriented counterparts are captured by Panel B.  OLS estimates provide a baseline of 
mean effects and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate quantiles in the conditional 
distributions of the outcome variable. The following findings could be established. (1) Economic 
prosperity decreases CC in both  religious traditions with the magnitude of the negative effect 
increasing(decreasing) in Christianity(Islam) oriented countries. (2) While population growth is a 
tool for CC only at the top quantile of the Christian distribution, its effect is unclear in their 
Islam oriented counterparts, as the sign changes across specifications. (3) While democracy is a 
tool  for  CC  from  the  0.25th   quantile  across  the  distribution(with  increasing  magnitude)  in 
Christian oriented countries, only  bottom quantiles of Islam oriented countries experience the 
democratization  process  as  a  measure  of  reducing  corrupt  practices.  (4)  Government 
effectiveness and regulation quality  increase CC in countries with both religious traditions. (5) 
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OLS estimates are significantly different from those of QR across the distributions; confirming 
the hypothesis  that OLS estimates maybe a misleading policy basis, when countries with the 
same religious traditions have different levels of CC.  (6)The LAD  findings correspond to the 
0.50th quantile results across specifications.
Table 2: Religious determinants of Corruption-Control(CC)
Panel A: Christian Dominated Countries(30)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.158** -0.046 0.004 -0.025 -0.046 -0.096 -0.155
(0.048) (0.474) (0.960) (0.592) (0.440) (0.124) (0.459)
Economic Prosperity -0.014*** -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.006* -0.017*** -0.036***
(0.002) (0.176) (0.998) (0.149) (0.060) (0.000) (0.003)
Population growth -0.048 -0.115*** -0.268*** -0.210*** -0.115*** 0.016 0.200**
(0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.481) (0.013)
Democracy 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.012 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.055***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.121) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Regulation  Quality 0.550*** 0.627*** 0.654*** 0.632*** 0.627*** 0.596*** 0.489***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  270 270 270 270 270 270 270
Specification 2
Constant -0.102* -0.048 -0.313*** -0.127** -0.048 0.076 0.327***
(0.096) (0.639) (0.000) (0.033) (0.412) (0.452) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.026***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.658) (0.197) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth 0.049** 0.011 -0.030 -0.059** 0.011 0.069* 0.134***
(0.043) (0.829) (0.307) (0.014) (0.631) (0.093) (0.000)
Democracy 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 -0.007
(0.363) (0.477) (0.626) (0.495) (0.482) (0.345) (0.227)
Government Effectiveness 0.823*** 0.799*** 0.829*** 0.787*** 0.799*** 0.844*** 0.944***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 270
Panel B: Islam Oriented Countries(16)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.076 0.063 -0.067 -0.029 0.063 0.140 0.386***
(0.261) (0.494) (0.318) (0.527) (0.240) (0.231) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity 0.0007 -0.009 -0.001 -0.004 -0.009*** 0.008 0.006**
(0.879) (0.368) (0.691) (0.163) (0.009) (0.281) (0.017)
Population growth -0.094*** -0.087* -0.130*** -0.103*** -0.087*** -0.093* -0.085***
(0.002) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000)
Democracy 0.008 0.003 0.015** 0.012** 0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.260) (0.679) (0.044) (0.021) (0.603) (0.655) (0.601)
Regulation  Quality 0.821*** 0.831*** 0.865*** 0.851*** 0.831*** 0.741*** 0.821***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Specification 2
Constant -0.239*** -0.199* -0.395*** -0.362*** -0.199*** -0.142*** -0.121
(0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.281)
Economic Prosperity -0.005 -0.010 -0.014*** -0.009 -0.010*** 0.001 0.003
(0.191) (0.155) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.730) (0.650)
Population growth 0.101*** 0.108** 0.081*** 0.096** 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.137**
(0.000) (0.026) (0.001) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
Democracy 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.013
(0.224) (0.444) (0.623) (0.836) (0.274) (0.357) (0.306)
Government Effectiveness 0.854*** 0.906*** 0.831*** 0.838*** 0.906*** 0.906*** 0.895***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 144 144 144 144 1444 144 144
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. 
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4.Conclusion 
 
Our findings  demonstrate that blanket corruption control policies are unlikely to succeed 
equally across countries with  different legal-traditions, religious-influences and  political wills 
in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on 
the prevailing levels of corruption-control as we have elucidated above. As a policy implication, 
corruption-control initiatives should be tailored differently across the  best and worst  corruption-
fighting  countries  especially  with  respect  to  democracy,  population  growth  and  economic 
prosperity. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Dependent Variable Control of Corruption -0.612 0.561 -1.694 1.086 414
Control  Variables 
Economic  Prosperity 4.602 5.254 -31.30 37.99 414
Population Growth 2.262 0.815 -0.143 4.477 414
Democracy 2.903 3.896 -8.000 10.000 414
Regulation Quality -0.651 0.617 -2.394 0.905 414
Government Effectiveness -0.703 0.603 -1.774 0.807 414
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
CC RQ RL GE V& A PolS Demo GDPg Popg
1.000 0.753 0.867 0.865 0.628 0.648 0.452 -0.043 -0.292 CC
1.000 0.857 0.865 0.751 0.624 0.466 0.109 -0.224 RQ
1.000 0.907 0.700 0.756 0.510 0.063 -0.282 RL
1.000 0.699 0.644 0.483 0.036 -0.396 GE
1.000 0.582 0.750 0.050 -0.100 V& A
1.000 0.492 0.070 -0.194 PolS
1.000 0.073 -0.094 Demo
1.000 0.279 GDPg
1.000 Popg
CC: Control of Corruption. RQ: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law.  GE: Government Effectiveness. V& A: Voice & Accountability. PolS: 
Political Stability. Demo: Democracy. GDPg: GDP Growth. Popg: Population Growth
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